Research into visual reasoning up to now has focused on images that are literal depictions of their objects. I argue in this article that an important further mode of visual reasoning operates on images that depict objects metaphorically. Such images form part of the class of expressive symbols: they are found, for example, in allegorical representations in works of visual art, studied by iconology. They were also a common way of encapsulating insights about the universe in natural philosophy in the Renaissance. Many writers assume that expressive symbols have vanished from modern science, but I argue in the second part of the article that mathematical law statements in present-day physics should be seen, in part, as images that constitute expressive symbols of the world. In support of this view, I offer evidence that law statements relate to their objects metaphorically and that physicists engage with them primarily through visual inspection and visual reasoning.
Visual reasoning with literal depictions
This article has two aims. The first is to broaden the scope of discussions of visual reasoning by arguing that visual reasoning operates on a larger class of images than hitherto acknowledged. Whereas discussions of visual reasoning have so far focused on images taken to be literal depictions of the objects of the reasoning, I will seek to extend the domain to cover images that constitute-for want of a better word at this stage-metaphorical depictions of objects. I will proceed partly by bringing into contact bodies of literature that are usually kept apart. The second aim, to which I will turn in section 4, is to argue that this account applies also to law statements in present-day sciences such as physics. I will argue both that law statements partly constitute metaphorical depictions of their objects, and that physicists achieve understanding of them mainly by visual inspection and visual reasoning.
Research into visual reasoning by cognitive scientists, philosophers, and others has proceeded along various lines. The ground has been prepared by work seeking to revalue visual thinking by comparison with propositional thinking (Arnheim 1969) , analyses of the roles of illustrations in science (Mazzolini 1993) , and discussions of the similarities and intersections of science and visual art (Baigrie 1996; Gooding 2004) . Further research has focused on the use of images in concrete media, such as diagrams on paper.
Topics of this research have included the epistemology of diagrams in mathematical arguments (Brown 1999; Giaquinto 2007 ) and graphical modelling techniques in physics, such as Feynman diagrams (Kaiser 2005; Meynell 2008) . A parallel line of research has studied the apprehension and manipulation of images conceived in the mind. Research in this vein has studied, among other phenomena, the mental rotation of representations to ascertain whether a given object is congruent to another (Shepard and Metzler REASONING WITH VISUAL METAPHORS 3 1971; Shepard and Cooper 1982) , the mental scanning of representations to compare spatially separated properties of objects (Kosslyn 1980) , visualizations of the dynamics of physical systems, such as projectile motion (Gentner and Stevens 1983) , the manipulation of mental images in thought experiments (Gendler 2004) , and visual thinking in the design of technical artefacts (Ferguson 1992) .
These otherwise diverse lines of research share a notable feature: almost without exception, they discuss images taken to be literal depictions of their objects. This assumption holds on two levels: researchers portray the cognitive agents whose visual reasoning they model as conceiving images to be literal depictions of objects, but they also tacitly endorse the conception of those images as literal depictions, building the property of literalness into their accounts of visual reasoning.
"Literalness" is notoriously hard to define. If one accepts a resemblance theory of representation, one is inclined to think that a literal representation shows the highest possible degree of resemblance to its object: this degree is obtained when the representation is isomorphic to its object, i.e. when there is a one-to-one correspondence between elements of the object and elements of the representation. However, this proposal fails to take sufficiently into account the fact that even what we call a literal depiction of an object exhibits a degree of simplification, abstraction, and idealization:
indeed, insofar as a depiction differs from its object in any respect, it may be regarded as simplifying, abstracting from, and idealizing it. An improved proposal, therefore, is to say that a depiction is literal if it can be smoothly and cumulatively transformed into another depiction that has any desired degree of isomorphism to its object. A map is a literal depiction of a landscape in this sense: whereas any usable map incorporates substantial simplification, abstraction, and idealization, we can smoothly and cumulatively augment a REASONING WITH VISUAL METAPHORS 4 map by increasing the scale and inserting detail to achieve as high a degree of isomorphism to the landscape as we wish.
The images studied up to now in research into visual reasoning share this property of literalness. Take as an example the mental images used in classic thought experiments in physics, such as Galileo's tower, Newton's bucket, Maxwell's demon, Einstein's lift, Heisenberg's gamma-ray microscope, and Schrödinger's cat (Brown 1991) : each of these images is presented as a literal depiction of a physical effect. The effect may be encountered in the actual world (free fall) or be deemed impossible (a demon sorting molecules by velocity), and the image may depict familiar articles (a bucket) or imaginary machinery (a lift falling freely in empty space).
Nonetheless, the image in each case is intended to model a physical effect literally, thereby supporting the inference that some relation holds or does not hold in the actual world. Thought experiments of this kind owe their evidential value to the literalness of the images that they employ.
Some other classes of depiction discussed in research into visual reasoning count as literal on the grounds that, rather than reproducing preexisting objects, they call objects into being. A diagram used in a visual proof of Pythagoras's theorem, for example, creates a particular geometrical construction-or, for some Platonists, picks out one element from the plenitude of all existing mathematical entities-and thus is necessarily isomorphic to the object that it is intended to depict. Similarly, when an engineer conceives a mental image of an artefact that he or she is designing, that image is isomorphic to the intended object by virtue not of faithfully reproducing it, but of being a mental blueprint of it.
Even writers who differ on other fundamental issues pertaining to visual images seem to agree not to widen the scope of the discussion beyond images that constitute literal depictions. For example, both sides in the so- (Kosslyn et al. 1979; Block 1981) . Broadening the scope to encompass metaphorical depictions would seem likely to alter materially the terms of this debate.
While research into visual reasoning has placed the category of the literal at the centre of discussion, other academic disciplines concerned with representation attribute less importance to it. Researchers in linguistics, literary studies, rhetoric, and allied disciplines call into question the assumption that there is a sharp dividing line between literal and non-literal depictions. Many researchers in these disciplines take the concept of metaphor as the crucial organizing principle: they devote attention to the seeming ubiquity of metaphor, the hypothesis that all meaning is metaphorical, and the roles of metaphor in cognition (Black 1962; Shibles 1971; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Ortony 1993) . Philosophers and historians of science too have increasingly acknowledged the use of metaphor in scientific discourse and practice, especially in the formation of new concepts and the construction of models and explanations (Hesse 1966; Bailer-Jones 2002) , and particularly in sciences such as psychology (Leary 1990 ). Feminist scholars in science studies have shown the role of scientific metaphors in maintaining gender hierarchies (Keller 1995) . These lines of research into metaphor are partial in another way, however: the metaphors that they study are conceptual rather than visual. The metaphorical depiction of the brain as a computer, for example, which became popular in the 1970s, was intended to suggest conceptualizations of the brain as an information-processing device, but did not consist primarily of visual depictions or involve visual reasoning.
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The branch of art history and criticism known as iconology has flourished since the 1930s (Panofsky 1939; Gombrich 1965 Gombrich , 1972 . Iconology studies the meanings of allegorical symbols in works of visual art, such as the personifications of moral virtues and human attributes found in ancient, Renaissance, and Baroque painting and sculpture. It also studies emblems as encapsulations of wisdom (Manning 2004) . Symbols of these kinds constitute visual metaphors of their referents.
This brief and selective survey reveals the existence of at least three distinct research programmes: an intensive investigation of visual reasoning restricted to images taken to be literal depictions of objects, an exploration of the role of conceptual metaphors both in literary discourses and in scientific reasoning, and a rich study of the meanings of visual metaphors in art. So far, these research programmes have not overlapped to consider reasoning that operates on visual metaphors. It seems natural now to attempt to develop this topic. By reasoning that operates on visual metaphors, I mean reasoning that consists in the inspection, exploration, analysis, interpretation, and manipulation of images that stand to their subject matter in a metaphorical, rather than a literal, relation. These images may be recorded in concrete media, or they may be mental constructs. The treatise is a description of a criminal justice system that is both literal and non-visual. The property of literalness is assured by the facts that the authors provide a high degree of detail of the different modes and stages of operation of the criminal justice system, and moreover that their account can be smoothly and cumulatively augmented in order to attain any required degree of isomorphism with its object. The treatise includes chapters on trial procedure, requirements for establishing guilt, and principles of sentencing and punishment, among others, any of which could be extended and rendered more detailed. The property of being non-visual is demonstrated by the treatise's lack of reliance on visual imagery. The account consists of the introduction and discussion of abstract concepts and categories. Learning about the criminal justice system from the account involves no visual reasoning, but only conceptual reasoning.
By contrast, the image of Justitia is a depiction of a criminal justice system that is both metaphorical and visual. The metaphorical nature of the depiction consists in the fact that no attempt is made to match the complexity of the structure of the criminal justice system in the image of Justitia. Facets of the system are evoked by the attributes of the scales and the sword in a global and indirect way. Furthermore, the image does not lend itself to augmentation in order to account for further details of the criminal justice REASONING WITH VISUAL METAPHORS 8 system: the image is substantially a finished artefact, which may be accepted or rejected but in which additional levels of detail cannot easily be inserted.
Like the textbook, nonetheless, the image of Justitia is a medium for conveying information about the criminal justice system. The viewer accesses knowledge of the object by inspecting, analyzing, and interpreting the image-in other words, by visual reasoning. By conducting a visual exploration of the image, the viewer is able to reconstruct information about the identity and the property of the object depicted.
I call images that are both visual and metaphorical depictions of an object "expressive symbols". What is required for an image such as the figure of Justitia to count as an expressive symbol, and thereby to act as a source of information about another object? For this to be possible, there must be some correspondence between the properties of the object and those of the image.
Expressive symbols contain parts that are literal depictions of certain objects, whose properties are shared by the object for which the expressive symbol as a whole stands. Consider again the image of Justitia: this contains parts that consist of images of scales and a sword. The images of scales and the sword are literal depictions of real scales and swords. Real scales can be used to compare weights, and real swords can be used to inflict punishment. These properties of scales and swords are shared by the criminal justice system, where they are known as the properties of evenhandedness and retributiveness.
The inclusion of images of scales and of a sword in the image of Justitia ties the latter image objectively to the properties of having the capacities of comparing weights and inflicting punishment. There is, thus, an objective relation between the portrayal of Justitia and the properties of a criminal justice system. This objective relation ensures that the former can be used as a source of knowledge about the properties of the latter.
REASONING WITH VISUAL METAPHORS 9
We exploit these facts about expressive symbols whenever we infer information about an object from an expressive symbol. For example, the eyes of Justitia are uncovered in ancient and medieval portrayals, whereas the figure is more usually blindfolded in depictions dating from the end of the fifteenth century onwards (Jay 1999 )-Pomeroy's statue on the Old Bailey, erected in 1906, goes against this trend. Like Justitia's other attributes, a real blindfold has an objective property: it prevents the wearer from seeing. The iconology thus suggests that the prevailing conception of justice underwent change around 1500. The interpretation is subject to a degree of underdetermination, admittedly: the blindfold might signify an incapacity to detect when the scales are in balance or inaccuracy in wielding the sword.
One must turn to additional evidence to determine that the blindfold actually stands for a lack of regard for the identity of persons appearing before the law. Nonetheless, it is not purely by virtue of convention that the blindfold stands for this feature. the criterion by which to decide how punishment is to be applied. (Mannozzi 2002, p. 227) In this passage, Mannozzi invites us to scrutinize the image of Justitia, to interpret parts of the image, and to infer what they tell us about a certain criminal justice system.
The acknowledgement that we use visual reasoning to explore expressive symbols helps to undermine the persistent idea that, because images are delivered to the eye in an all-at-once manner, whereas discursive texts must be scanned sequentially, we perceive the meaning of images in a single act, in an instantaneous and unstructured event, as if in a flash (Shlain 1998, pp. 4-5) . One would not expect instant recognition if visual reasoning is involved. The experimental evidence seems to support this scepticism. Data show that human observers are capable of identifying the gist of even a complex visual scene within 30 to 50 milliseconds, a fraction of a single fixation, without attention shifts. However, searching for and identifying individual components of a visual scene requires time-consuming additional processing (Henderson and Ferreira 2004) . Cogitation to establish the significance and meaning of a component, such as Justitia's scales, will require more time still.
The problem of conventionality
Requiring that an image be a literal depiction of an object has one valuable advantage: it rules out the possibility that the image is purely conventional. If we define literalness in terms of isomorphism between image and object, as I suggested in section 1, then the question whether a given image is a literal REASONING WITH VISUAL METAPHORS 11 depiction of a given object depends partly on the structure of the image and of the object: it cannot be a purely conventional matter. This means, among other things, that an image that is a literal depiction of its object is objectively either an adequate or an inadequate depiction. This, of course, enhances the usefulness of such images in visual reasoning.
At the other extreme, many classes of symbols stand to objects in a purely conventional relation. We may choose any sign we please as the conventional symbol of a given object, although our choice may be guided by pragmatic considerations. Examples of conventional symbols are many of the letters that stand for numbers and other terms in mathematical formulae, such as "π" and "e". However, these observations refute neither the claim that a given expressive symbol truly stands for a particular object, nor the claim that information about an object can be extracted from its symbol, so that it can be correctly established which object a symbol stands for. After all, even a discursive text carries information only in virtue of a code, without knowledge of which it cannot be understood: this fact does not usually lead us to doubt that pieces of discursive text may truly be depictions of specified objects. The same holds for expressive symbols. A depiction of Justitia stands for justice only on the strength of certain tenets of classical culture; but once those tenets are given, then in virtue of its intrinsic properties a depiction of Justitia truly represents justice, and not war, love or some other object. The fact that the interpretation of expressive symbols is based on representational conventions does not transform such symbols into an arbitrary code.
Similarly, describing a person by using the metaphor of a fox is not a purely conventional act. Foxes objectively have certain properties that partly coincide with the human trait of cunning. Someone who hears the description and who possess the necessary knowledge about foxes will be able to infer that the person is being portrayed as cunning.
There has been long discussion of the distinction between "conventional" and "natural" signs. Conventional signs are supposed to be arbitrary, instituted, and local, while natural signs are motivated, objective, and universal. Charles S. Peirce classified signs into three categories: icons, which are signs by resemblance or analogy, indices, which are signs by causal connection, such as the trace of a physical process, and symbols, which are signs by convention (Short 2007 The distinction is often treated by reference to words and images.
Nelson Goodman (1976) argued that all pictorial representation is completely conventional: there are no relations between the features of a picture and its referent that can determine the content of a picture. Other writers take the view that representations consisting of natural signs are superior to those consisting of conventional signs: their grounds are generally that natural signs bear a likeness to their objects while a conventional sign represents its object only by chance. Yet others insist that the conventional signs of which language consists are a representational tool superior to natural signs such as images, because they are capable of articulating complex entities and relations while images can only display entities (Rollin 1976 ).
In Plato's dialogue, Cratylus, Socrates attempts to convince Cratylus that words, like images, have a connection of resemblance with the objects for which they stand, and are therefore not conventional signs. Later in the dialogue, though, Socrates seems to question the resemblance theory not only for words but also for images, leading towards the conclusion that neither words nor images are fully natural signs (Reeve 1998 ).
E. H. Gombrich once spoke of "the commonsense distinction between images which are naturally recognisable because they are imitations and words which are based on conventions" (Gombrich 1981, p. 11) . The contrast between images and words that he drew on that occasion should be qualified: after all, as Gombrich (1956; Mitchell 1986, pp. 75-94) (Boas 1993, p. 14) In the same vein, John Dee in 1564 proposed a symbol that he called monas hieroglyphica, which he took to encapsulate the essence of the universe (Josten 1964; Clulee 2005) . This compact symbol incorporates a circle that represents the sun, a semicircle that represents the Moon, a cross, and the zodiacal sign of Aries.
In present-day terms, the image of the winged serpent described by The occult tradition failed to distinguish between the literal and the metaphorical: in that tradition, analogies were taken to be relations between things in the world, rather than purely inferential and explanatory devices. In the scientific tradition, by contrast, "a clear distinction is made between words and things and between literal and metaphorical language" (Vickers 1984, p. 95) . According to Vickers, metaphor Whereas Vickers might depict this evolution as a transition from metaphorical to literal descriptions, it is more plausible to assume that Kepler's Neoplatonist views about the relation of mathematics to the world remained unchanged, and that he simply drew on two different branches of mathematics in successive decades to explore this relation.
Here I suggest that there is substantial continuity between the metaphorical approach of Renaissance thinkers and the mathematical laws formulated by modern scientists: I contend that mathematical laws of nature should be regarded in important respects as visual metaphors. This claim has two parts: the claim that laws stand to phenomena in a relation that can be described as metaphorical rather than literal, and the claim that laws are primarily visual images, which scientists apprehend by visual inspection and on which they perform visual reasoning.
Let us take first the claim that mathematical laws of nature stand in a metaphorical rather than in a literal relation to their objects (McAllister 1997) .
Clearly, the language of mathematical equations is more sophisticated and precise than that of geometrical symbolism: the formal rules for manipulating Each data point is the consequence of a large number of causal factors, many of which are idiosyncratic to particular situations, including experimental apparatus (Scriven 1961; Cartwright 1983, pp. 54-73) Dalitz (1987, p. 20) .
Whereas it is possible to apprehend conceptual beauty by non-visual means, I
suggest that mathematical beauty is apprehended visually in the first instance. For example, the symmetries among Maxwell's equations, on which many physicists have remarked, are a primarily visual property.
If both these conclusions are accepted, then laws of nature in modern physics constitute to a large extent visual metaphors. They are then objects of visual reasoning, and they stand in largely metaphorical relation to their objects. This suggests that there is substantial continuity between modern laws of nature and the expressive symbols of Renaissance natural philosophy.
The resemblance is most pronounced for laws of nature with the widest scope. What James B. Hartle and Stephen W. Hawking (1983) call "the wave function of the universe", derived from the Schrödinger equation, is not very different in intent from Dee's monas hieroglyphica. Admiring Lagrangian functions, Alfred North Whitehead suggested in an evocative way their continuity with an earlier natural philosophy: "The beauty and almost divine simplicity of these equations is such that these formulae are worthy to rank with those mysterious symbols which in ancient times were held directly to indicate the Supreme Reason at the base of all things" (Whitehead 1926, p. 91) .
Let us summarize the position that we have reached. It appears that laws of nature share some striking properties of images that constitute expressive symbols of the world, pertaining both to the relation in which they stand to the world and their visual dimension. It is therefore a plausible conjecture that visual reasoning is the prime technique for thinking about and with laws of nature. That is, physicists and other scientists formulate laws of nature, learn about them, develop an understanding of their content, REASONING WITH VISUAL METAPHORS 22 investigate their implications, manipulate them, and appraise them primarily by means of visual reasoning.
A broader view of visual reasoning
Some laws of nature appear to depict a domain of phenomena that is visualizable in everyday terms; other laws, as we know from the development of quantum mechanics, offer no coherent visualization of phenomena. There is also, however, another sense in which laws of nature may or may not be amenable to visual reasoning. This sense comes to light when we ask whether the formulation, understanding, and manipulation of laws of nature involve visual reasoning.
In the previous section, I have provided grounds for thinking that the answer to this question is positive. Laws of nature resemble images that constitute expressive symbols of the world: constructs of both these kinds represent the world in a holistic manner, not entailing any literal claim about occurrences, and in a visual manner. The fact that the class of expressive symbols also includes Dee's monas hieroglyphica and portrayals of Justitia should not induce anyone to think that my account devalues laws of nature.
To the contrary, it is a credit to the concept of law of nature that laws play such an iconic role in modern culture.
With this conclusion, the strands of research surveyed in section 1 are brought into contact. There appears to be a well-demarcated domain and a solid foundation for the study of visual reasoning that involves metaphors. It is to be hoped that current research into visual reasoning is broadened beyond the literal.
